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THE IMPOTENCE OF GRIEF:
ON MELVILLE'S \TRETCHED \rOMEN
AND LONESOME GIRLS
I stood, and leaning o'er the garden-gate
Reviewed that rù/oman's suff'rings, and it seemed
To comfort me while with a brother's love
I blessed her in the impotence of grief.(William \il/ordsworth, "The Ruined Cottage")
Pierre; o4 Tbe Ambiguities (New York, Jvly 1852) brought
novelist Herman Melville the most abusive criticisms of his
career as a professional v/riter. Charged with "faults,"
"absurdities," and "incongruities" of all sorts,t this "regular ro-
mance" (as he called it, in an unsuccessful attempt to convince
his London publisher Richard Bentley to buy the English
rights) turned into a memorable disaster in both literary
appreciation and the marketplace. In fact, far from being
' Reviews of. Pierre (here in particular, August 19 and Z7 , September 18,
and November 20, 1852) can be found 1n Herman Melaille: An Annotated
Bibliograpby, L846-1930, ed. Brian Higgins (Boston: H^ll, 1979), pp. 120-26.For
a detailed account of the sales of Pierre and Melville's financial failure, see
Hershel Parker's second section of the "Historical Note" to Pierre; or Tbe
Ambiguities, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle
(Evanston and Chicago: Northwestem U. P. and The Newberry Libnry, l97L),
pp.)79-80,tr.
"calculated for popularity,"' the novel of the ambiguities
proved not only an aesthetic failure, but also a deliberate and
functional representation of the failure of aesthetics itself.
Pastoral idylls and gothic reversals, domesticity and the
mysteries of genealogy, elopement and disinheritance,
narcissism and titanism, murdeq incest, and suicide - Melville
capitahzed on all the literary stereotypes at hand to drarnatize
the artistic (Mil3)Bildung of his immature hero and expose rhe
inadequacy of romantic consciousness at large. This aesthetic
destruction, in turn, involved an unsystematic though
devastating philosophical critique, one that put to quesrion the
ontological and theological nodons of the metaphysical
tradition. More narrowly, at the heart of such a ruthless
exposure of idealistic aesthetics and \Western metaphysics lay a
critique of the national ideology that Melville set up and
carried out through a self-conscious rewrite of the story of his
own artistic development and political engagements, while at
the same time striking, as a harsh reviewer prompdy noticed, at
"the very foundations of society."' As such, Pierre may indeed
be viewed as a crucial work in Melville's canon - an explosive
recapitulation of the author's early fiction, based on a critical
re-vision of the culture's romantic and democratic
commitments to mid-century Ameríca. The "un-writing of
Moh-Dick," as Pierre has been stvled bv Sacvan Bercovitch.
' Melville, "To Richard Bentley, 16 April 1852," Conespondence, ed.Lynn
Horth (Evanston and Chicago: Northrvestern U. P. and The Newberry Library
1993), p.226.
' George \lashington Peck, American Vhig Reuieto, 1 November 1852,
Tbe Meloille Log: ADocumentary Life of Herman Meluille, 1819-1891.,2 vols., ed.
J ay Leyda (New York: Harcouft , Brace and Co., I 95 1 ), vol. I, p. 463 .
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was at once a representation of "the failure of s)tmbolic art"
and "the betrayal of Young America in literature."a
The novel of the ambiguities opened a new period in
Melville's career. There was not to be another "mighty book"t
like Mardi (1849), Moby-Dick (1851), or Pierre itself, whether
written to promote a national literature commensurate with
the greatness of the country's democratic and expansionist
politics or un-written, as it were, to debunk its projects and
reverse its imperialistic aspirations. As Melville turned into an
apparently less ambitious (and often anonymous) magazine
writer, his production witnessed a sudden formal fragmenta-
tion, along with what may be called a symptomatic contraction
of his characters' stature. "From being heroic, larger than life,
more gifted or more favored than others, asTaji, Ahab, Pierre,"
the protagonist of Melville's fiction, we have long been told,
"becomes suddenly the most insignificant of beings, most
humble, most undistinguished, most forgotten, as Bartleby, the
projected Agatha, the Chola widow, Israel Potter,
Merrymusk."t This catalogue could indeed be expanded to
include Martha Coulter of "Poor Man's Pudding," the "white
gids" of "The Tartarus of Maids," "poor Jimmy Rose," weary
and "lonely" Marianna, as well as all the other sorry examples
of "luckless humanity" that Melville sketched in his fiction of
the 1850s.'
o Sacvan Bercovitch, "How to Read Melville's Pierre," Amerikastudien,)l
(1986), p. 49; a considerably expanded version of this essay, titled "Pierre, ot the
Ambiguities of American Literary History" is n Tbe Rites of Assent:
Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of Arnerica (New York: Routledge,
r9%),pp.246-J06.
' Melville, Pierre, cit., p. 456.
' Elizabeth Foster, "Introduction" to Melville, The Confidence-Man: His
Masquerade (New York: Hendricks House, 1954), pp. lxxxix-xc.
' Melville, "Poor Man's Pudding and Rich Man's Crumbs" (1854), "The
Paradise of Bachelors and The Tartarus of Maids" (1855), "Jimmy Rose" (1855),
"ThePiazza" (1856), The Piazza Tales and Other Prose Pieces: 1839-1860, eds.
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This view has been reiterated time and again in Melville
criticism and has often led to the emphasizing, for better or for
worse, of the concept of sympathy. If the hero/ine "becomes
the helpless victim,"u then Melville may as well be seen as a
compassionate chronicler who tells the story of his or her
misfortunes - a gloomy though humane author who suppo-
sedly grounds his new artistic stance in a liberal ethics of
fellow-feeling. But if the destruction of romantic aesthetics
represented in/by Pierre can indeed be taken as a turning
point in Melville's canon, then it seems unlikely that after such
an apocalypse of negation the author of the ambiguities would
candidly resort to one of the most exploited modes (perhaps
the mode par excellence) of romantic literature at large - "1[s
liberal humanism of sentimentality."e In fact, the moving
condition of wretched humanity had been at once employed
and questioned within romantic tradition itself. And even
when sentimentality can be rehabilitated as "a crucial tactic of
politically radical representation,"'0 or reclaimed as that
conspicuous "body of mid-nineteenth-century American
literature 1...1 that takes as its highest values sympathy,
affection, and relation,"tt whether mostly written by women or
not, problems may still come to the surface. "That feeling and
empathy are deepest where the capacity to act has been
suspended - as it is in the reader's relation to art - defines
Harrison Hayford, Alma A. MacDougall, G. Thomas Tanselle, et. al. (Evanston
and Chicago: Northrvestern U. P. and The Newberry Library 1987), pp.29l,
)30, )45,8; Melville, Israel Potter: His Fifty Years if Exile (rS:+, rAij), .a..
Haford, Parker, and Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Norrhwestern U. P. and
The Newberry Library 1982), p. 160.
' Foster, "Introduction" to The Confidence-Man, cxt., p. xc.
' Philip Fisher, Hard Facts: Setting and Forn in the Arnerican Noael (New
York: Oxford U. P., 1985), p. 92.
'o lbidem.
" Joanne Dobson, "Reclaiming Sentimental Literature," American
Literature, 69 (1997 ), p. 2$.
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the limit of sentimental representation." This "limit," maintains
Philip Fisher, makes of sentimentality "a cautious and
questionable politics."" In the production of Melville's middle
period, sentimental strategies of representation based on
"sympathy, affection, and relation" are, to say the least, suspect
and problematic.
In fact, recalling that most of "his magazine pieces deal
essentially and unsentimentally with some kind of loss, poverty,
loneliness, or defeat,"li a number of skeptical critics have often
doubted Melville's use of pathos and emotions. They have
raised questions about the "condition of suffering" he
portrays, as well as "the quality of sympathy which attends it."
They have cautioned readers against the appearances of
"sorrow" that the author might cleverly manipulate in order to
trouble the expectations of his sentimental audience, thus
calling attention, instead, to the possibility "of false or mispla-
ced pity," "the diminishing role" of love and philanthropy, the
"lack of communal feeling" or "cheering communion of
souls."ra Further, they have seen these strategies as part of a deli-
' ' Fisher, HardFacts,cit.,p. I22.
" Robert Milder, in his incisive "Introduction" to Melville, Billy Budd,
Sailor and Selected Tales (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1998), p. ix, recalls and quotes
from Charvat's seminal piece "Melville and the Common Reader," The Profession
of Authorship in America: Tbe Papers of Villiam Cbaroat, ed. MatthewJ. Bruccoli
(Columbus: Ohio State U. P., 1968), p. 27 9.
'o This vielv (mainly developed in Melville criticism of the 1970s) has been
expressed by Robert Sattelmeyer and James Barbour, "The Sources and Genesis
of Melville's 'Norfolk Isle and the Chola \lidow'," Ameican Literature, 5O
(1978-79), pp. 414-16, and by Marvin Fisher, Going Under: Meluille's Short
Fíction and the Ameican 18J0s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. P., 1977), pp.
62, 70. Melville's use of sentimentality and humanism has been also more or less
effectively questioned by Howard D. Pearce, "The Narrator of 'Norfolk Isle and
the Chola \lidow'," Studies in Short Fiction, ) (1965-66), pp.56-62; Robert C.
Albrecht, "The Thematic Unity of Melvillet 'The Encantadas'," Texas Studies in
Literature and Langaage, 14 (1972-73), pp. 474-75; R. Bruce Bickley, J4 The
Method of Meluille's Short Fiaioz (Durham: Duke U. P., 1975), pp. 37-8; \Iililliam
B. Dillingham, Meluille's Short Fiction: 1853-1856 (Athens: U. of Georgia P.,
1977), pp.85-6.
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berate "reproachl' to a "conventional 'kindly reader'," usually
invoked "and counted on to feel sympathy for the sufferings óf
the lower ofde-rs" or of a systemadc "destruction," as it has
been also argued, "of [the] idealistic view of charity" atlarge."
But if it is true that Melville used and often manipulated these
banished victims of humanity in a functional way, then it is also
true that his subversive strategies did not exclusively serve
against the literary cause of sentimentality as such, or, for that
matte! against the cultural one of social fragmentation or of
liberal and charitable Christianity. Though the skeptical and
unsentimental approach to his middle period is, in fact, more
plausible and suggestive than the former (the one that sees
Melville progressively move toward a sort of "last-ditch
humanism")," they both prove reductíve. Their limitation
lies in a partial and unproblematíc understanding of the
sympathetic outlook that Melville allegedly employed and/or
subverted in his work. Thus the possibility of a different
approach to the concept of sympathy, as well as of a wider
reconstruction of its intellectual context, from the premises of
moral philosophy through the developments of sentimental
narrative and the grorvth of romantíc historical consciousness,
needs to be suggested here. Such a (trans)Atlantic context can
provide a different framework for an understanding of
Melville's use and abuse of the strategies of feeling and fellow-
feeling in the wake of Pierre, and therefore - as I shall argue
and exemplify through my reading of Melville's most unusual
(and rare) characters, namely his female characters - for a
potential reassessment of his middle period as a whole in terms
" Michael T. Gilmore, American Romanticism and the Marketplace(Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1985), p. 1,42;David, Andrews, "'Benito Cereno': No
Charity on Earth, Not Even at Sea," Leuiathan,2 (2000), p. 102.
16 Foster, "Introduction " to T h e Confidence-Man, cit., p. lxxxix.
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of a critique of historical consciousness. In a related essay,tt I
addressed the "little story" of "vanquished" Hunilla - the
"dark-damasked" heroine of the eighth sketch of "The
Encantadas," who may be said to stand as a representative of
wretched humanity at large as well as an emblematic example
of the subdued races of the American continent." In this essay
I will eventually focus on Marianna, the shy and solitary "pale-
cheeked gid" of "The Piazza,"" the story that Melville
purposely wrote to introduce his collection of previously
published magazine pieces of the early 1850s, thus titling them
The Piazza Tales (1,856).
The Ethics of Felloru-Feeling and Sentimental Representation
The influential systems of moral philosophy in Britain may
provide a helpful starting point not only for an understanding
of sympathy as a psychological and an ethical principle in
sentimental narrative, but also for an óutline of its subsequent
developments as a cognitive and a historical method in its own
right. As the reflections of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume
paved the way for Smith's Tbeory of Moral Sentiments, the
concept gained an unusually wide and inclusive definition.
Sympathy was no longer or not only meant as a slmonym of
pity or compassion:
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify
our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy,
" Giuseppe Nori, "The Trials of Humanity at the Margins of History: On
Herman Melville's Enchanted Isles," Anglixica,6 (2002), pp.6-85.
" Melville, "The Encantadas, or Enchanted Isles: By Salvator R.
Tarnmoor" (1854),ThePiazzaTalesandOtherProsePieces,cit.,pp.tSl, l5T,lS2.
" Melville, "ThePiazza," cit., p. 8.
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though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same,
may nov/, however, without much impropriety, be
made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any
passion whatever.'o
Viewed as such a comprehensive fellow-feeling, slmpathy
allows the "attentive spectator" to feel not only for the "misery"
or "the sorrow of others," but also for their joy and angeq
indignation and shame - in short, for "any passion whatever."
And the "source" of this fellow-feeling is "the imagination." It
is by the imagination that we - as beholders - can in fact
sympathize and identiS' with another person, that is, as Smith
has it, "put ourselves in his case." To begin with, imagination
comes primariiy into play when our external senses stop,
blocked, as it were, by their inability to give us an "immediate
experience of what other men feel." "Though our brother is
upon the îack," Smith observes, conjuring up a "situation" of
bodily pain, "our senses will never inform us what he suffers."
It ís through an imaginative projection that the spectator
changes "cifcumstances," "persons and characters" with the
sufferer, thereby experiencing an efface-ment and a fusion of
identity at the same time. Furtheq imagination allows the
viewer to feel for another not only what he actually feels or
may feel, but also, sometimes, what "he himself seems to be
altogether incapable" of feeling. "rX/e blush for the impudence
and rudeness of another," says Smith, "though he himself
appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own
behaviour." Such a vicarious "passion" (in this case, shame or
embarrassment) in fact "arises in our breast from the
imagination, though it does not in his from the reality."
Through sympathy, the self reaches out to the other - feels
'o Adam Smith, Tóe Theory of Moral Sentirnents (1759), eds.
Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), p. 10.
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with the other and understands his situation even when the
other seems to be "insensible" of it - and therefore, to a
certain extent, may be said to become the other. As an
"imaginaty" experience, this "change of situations" is altruistic
and disinterested exactly because it occurs outside the self. For
this reason, Smith claims in opposition to egoistic theories of
morality, sympathy "cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a
selfish principle.""
This benevolent self-projection, however, is just the
intermediate stage of a process that does not culminate in
tmaginary self-oblivion. "That imaginary change of situations,
upon which [...1 sympathy is founded," Smith points out, "is
but momentary." Sympathetic identification is an imaginary
and a temporary experience that is in fact conrolled by
consciousness. This "secret consciousness," Smith maintains,
never abandons the sympathizer because it intermittently
reminds him of his own personal identity. Thus in front of a
situation of suffering, for instance, the spectators' minds and
stations are inevitably determined by the "thought of their
own safety." The "thought that they themselves are not really
the sufferers," says Smith, "continually intrudes itself upon
them." As the sympathetic spectator realizes the ontological
boundaries of his own identity, he comes back (as it were) to
himself, and ultimately re-defines his own individuality in
terms of consciousness, however fluid that may be. In so
doing, he also realizes a difference, both "in degree" and "in
kind" between the sentiments. The psychological power of
sympathy cannot really bridge the variance of feeling, namely
the discrepancy between the reproduced emotion of the
beholder and the original one of the sufferer: "compassion,"
Smith says, "can never be exactly the same with original
D. D.
2' Ibidem,p. 12.
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sorrow'" "These two sentiments, however," he adds, "may [...J
have such a correspondence with one anothe! as is sufficient
for the harmony of society.""
Though "imaginary," "momentary," and somehow always
"imperfect" or approximate, this . "correspondence of
sentiments" comes to constitute the chief principle of our
moral judgment and conduct - the principle of approbation.
"To approve of the passions of another," Smith points out, "is
the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with
them"; "and not to approve of them as such," he adds, "is the
same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathíze
with them." To sympathize means to approve. And to approve
means to judge morally not only of the "propriety" but also of
the "merit and demerit," "dl)ty," "utility," and "virtue" of the
affections or actions of other men, as well as of our affections
and actions, both in their motives and in their effects."
Sentimental narrative may be said to have used and
adapted this psychological and ethical "correspondence of
sentiments" to create what I would call, slightly modifying
Fisher's terms, contracted "equations of feelings."'o By
contracted equations of feelings I mean sentimental correspon-
dences that exclusively link the pity felt by the spectator (as
well as by the reader of a text) to the sorrow experienced by
the sufferer (a character in the text). In other words,
sentimentality reduced Smith's comprehensive definition of
sympathy (qua "fellow-feeling with any passion whatever")
back to its original and narrower meaning of compassion in
relation to suffering.
This conceptual reduction, howeyer, was inherent in
Smith's argument. In spite of his wide definition of sympathy,
in fact, the moral philosopher (who knew the works of early
" Ibidern,pp.2l,22.
- l0nem, pp. r/ ,  ro.
" Fisher, Hard Facts, cit., p. 118.
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sentimental writers such as Gray, Rousseau, Richardson, and
others) had'often and explicitly suggested that thère are
certain sitúations ("the calamities to which the conditiodrof
mortality exposes mankind," for instance) and certain classes
of people (the "unfortunate and the injured" of humanity)
with which "we are most apt to sympathize."2t That is to say,
we are most inclined to feel for situations of suffering and
affliction (say, the "toments" of physical pain, "the loss of
reason," the "agony of disease," and so forth), and therefore
most likely to respond emotionally to the sufferers and the
afflicted themselves. "\(/e sympathize even with the dead,"
exclaims Smith, at once recapitulating and anticipating the
crucial strategy of sentimental representation - from Gray's
"annals of the poor" through tùTordsworth's "tale[s] of silent
suffering" - based on the moving evocation of a past life that
is not only írretrievably lost, but also "in danger of being
forgot" and "obliterated" forever:
It is miserable, we think, [...] to be no more thought of
in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from
the affections, and almost from the memory of their
dearest friends and relations. Surely, we imagine, we
can never feel too much for those who have suffered so
dreadful a calamity. The tribute of our fellow-feeling
seems doubly due to them now, when they are in
danger of being forgot by every body; and, by the vain
honours which v/e pay to their memory, we endeavour,
for our own misery artificially to keep alive our
melancholy remembrance of their misfortune.'6
" Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, cit., pp. 24, 12, 24.
" Ibidem, pp. l2-L3.I am here alluding to classic poems of the sentimental
tradition such as Thomas Grayt "Elegy lVritten in a Country Churchyard"
(1751) and William \íordsworth's "The Ruined Cottage" (1797 -ca. L799).
In all these cases (torture, folly, sickness, death), sympathy
is only and exclusiue/y compassion. "Compassion," maintains
Fisher, "exists in relation to suffering and makes of suffering
the primary subject matter [...] of sentimental narrative."'7 As
\ùTordsworth reminds us through the moral voice of his
peddler in "The Ruined Cottage," our conduct would be
severely reprehensible, should "our hearts [...] hold vain
dalliance with the misery [e]ven of the dead" and be just
"contented to draw [a] momentary pleasure [...] barren of all
future good."tt In fact, our psychological and emotional
involvement with the calamities of humanity (our fellow-
feeling with the misery, suffering and even death of our fellow
creatures) should not be selfishly sterile and aimless (an
ephemeral "dalliance"), but morally fruitful - a sentimental
education in its own right. "In our mournful thoughts,"
continues \ùTordsworth's "teacher of the sublimest morality,"'u
there always should be found a "poweî to virtue friendly."'o
This "power" is compassion, an ethical power teleologically
meant, so to speak, to show us the way and a higher purpose,
leading to both "future good" and "virtue" - indsscl "1hs
central moral category" of sentimental representation.rl
Sentimentality and Historicism
In reaction to the Enlightenment and its normative ideals,
this "central moral category" of sentimentality became also
" Fisher, Hard Faas, cit., p. I05.
" 
\William rùlordsworth, 
"The Ruined Cottage," Tbe Ruined Cottage and
The Pedlar, ed. James Butler (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1979),11.220 26.tt This is George Bancroftt synnpathetic definition of lùlordsworth's peddler
in "The Office of the People in Art, Govemment, and Religion" (18)5), Literary
and Historical Miscellanies (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855), pp. 4II-I2.
'o rù(/ordsworth, 
"The Ruined Cottage," cit.,I.229.
" Fisher, Hard Facts, cit., p. 95.
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and almost simultaneously the crucial tenet of anti-rationalistic
historical approaches - indeed a method in its own right that
was to shape those views of the past that we have come to
associate, for better or for worse, with the rise and
predominance of romantic consciousness and historiography
(historicism) over the course of the nineteenth century.
Romantic historicism may be said to have radicalized the
concept of sympathy not so much by narrowing down its
moral function to the one central category of compassion (on
the foreground of a common humanity), as by expanding its
cognitive function into a broader category of knowledge (on
the larger background of what, elsewhere, I called "a cosmic
metaphysics of the soul")." It thereby turned sympathy into
the epistemological premise of the "science and art" of
history." To feel with andlor to feel into (namely, "sympathy,"
"fellow-feeling," "Mitgefùhl," "Mitfùhlung," "Einfiihlung"),
for the romantic historian meant essentially to know.
"The foundation of Romantic historiography," maintains
Lionel Gossman, "was not a rhetoric but a metaphysics, a
philosophy of universal analogy, according to which the mind
can grasp the world, the self the otheg because they are
structured the same way."to The romantic view of history, in
fact, based the ethical experience of what was felt as an
original and disinterested "correspondence of sentiments"
(however "imaginary," "momentary" and "imperfect" that
"correspondence" may have been, in Smith's terms again) on a
more frrndamental "congruity" (fLbereinstimrnung) between
" Giuseppe Nori "The Problematics of Sympathy and Romantic
Historicism, " S tudies in Rom a n t icis m, 3 4 (1995): pp. 3 -28.
" Leopold von Ranke, "On the Character of Historical Science (A
Manuscript of the 1810s)," The Tbeory and Practice of History, eds. Georg G'
Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (tndianapolis: Bobbs-Menill., 1973), p. 3 4.
" Lionel Gossman, Betueen History and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard
U.P., 1990), p.297 .
4 I
the self and the other person (a "fellow-creature" or another
"soul"). Thus S7ilhelm von Humboldt:
All understanding presupposes in the person who
understands, as a condition of its possibility, an analogue
of that which will actually be undersrood later: an
original, antecedent congruity between subject and
object [...]. In the case of history that antecedent of
understanding is quite obvious, since everything which
is active in world history is also moving within the
human heart.rt
Invoked in similar terms by such diverse thinkers and writers
as Humboldt and Schleiermacher, Emerson and Bancroft,
Carlyle and Ranke, Manzoni and Michelet, Droysen and
Dilthey, this "congruity between subject and object" in turn
relied on a larger metaphysical belief (whether religious or
secular) in the commonality of life. The romantic ideal of a
cosmic identity (all beings sharing in the same living reality)
imposed no rigid division between selves and enriries. On the
contrary, it held them on a spiritual relation of embrace and
resemblance, agîeement and infinite analogy. This allowed
hypothetically the occurrence of a sympathetic fusion between
individuals ^s a natuîal event in the first place, then making
cognitive interactions possible as an obvious consequence. The
self could understand another self because they shared in the
same universal psychic nature. At the same rime, he could
understand the world of history because that world was the
product of his own soul as an agent of the universal mind -
the realm of his own spiritual makings (the world of "objective
spirit," as Dilthey called it after Vico and Hegel), inhabited
and cohabited with his fellow-creatures, past, present and to
r' lX/ilhelm von Humboldt, "On the Flistorian's Task" (1821), Ranke, The
Tbeory and Practice of History, cit., pp. 15-6.
/.)
come. In other words, on the grounds of an all-embracing
metaphysics of life (Lebensphilosophie), the process of
identification came to be envisioned as a cognitíve
"rediscovery," expanding from the self, through the other
person, to cultural systems, and universal history. Thus
Dilthey's theory of sympathetic understanding - what he
called, more specifically, "the understanding of other persons
and their expressions of life" - may be said to have
synthesized and at once brought to a climax "the epistemology
of history" of the nineteenth century:
Understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou: the
mind rediscovèrs itself at ever higher levels of complex
involvement: this ídentity of the mind in the I and the
Thou, in every subject of a community, in every system
of a culture and finally, in the totality of mind and
universal history, makes successful co-operation between
different processes in the human studies possible. The
knowing iubject is, here, one with its object, which is
the same at all stages of its objectification.'u
The romantic historian endowed this sympathetic
understanding with an irresistible cognitive power that, from a
theoretical perspective, allowed him to penetrate virtually into
all kinds of past forms and grasp them in their own terms. But
if it is true that all the past had a claim on the chronicler's
attention (as Ranke, Carlyle, and others believed), then it is
also true that his attention (as Thierry, Sismondi, and other
antagonistic writers taught) was more likely to be solicited by
what had usually been neglected or obliterated by the
dominant views of history. And it is in fact in the light of this
" V/ilhelm Dilthey, The Construction of tbe Historical World in the Hunuan
Studies (1906, 1910, 1927), \Y/ilhelm Dihhey: Selected Ulritings, ed. H' P Bickman
(Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., I97 6), pp. 1'92 -%, 207 -08.
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impartial and partial impulse that Thierry for instance, could
speak of his historical sympathy as a "plebeian sympathy" -
as both "an irresistible attraction" and a compassionate "duty
of filial píety" for the races, peoples, and classes that had been
either forgotten or erased in the annals of the rulers." The
"plebeian sympathy" of the historian was destined to qualifu
itself, quite naturally, as sympathy for the oppressed against the
oppressors. There was a redemptive tendency within romantic
historicism that never gave way to the eulogy of heroes or the
great men of universal history never revered the great powers."
This tendency was to be particularly problematic in the
United States, a new nation that was the outcome of a popular
assertion of freedom as political independence (a "new
plebeian democracy," as national historian George Bancroft
put it),re as well as the fruit of a modern and complex process
of settlement and colonization that had inevitably caused new
ncial antipathies and new victims. \X/hat was extolled as "the
common asylum" of oppressed humanity - 2 ((s6g11try in
which meet together all human races [...] and where men
entertain for their fellow-men," as Thierry maintained, "none
but sentiments of fraternity and affection"4o - had in fact been
established on an occupied soil, no matter how "low"o' the
" Augustin Thierry "Autobiographical Preface: History of My Historical
\lorks and Theories" (18J4), The Histoical Essays (Philadelphia: Carey and
Han,1845),p. xviii.
'8 f am alluding to Ranke's "The Great Powers" (l$3), The Theory and.
Practice of History, cit., pp. 65-1,0L, and Thomas Carlylet On Heroes, Hero-
'Vorchip 
and tbe Heroic in History (London: Chapman and Hall, 1841), two
classic texts that may be taken as largely representative of the dominant view of
history in the first half of the nineteenth century.
" George Bancroft, History of tbe United States, 10 vols. (Boston: Litde,
Brown, 1814-74), vol. IV, p. 11.
oo Thierry "On the Antipathy of Race which Divides the French Nation"
(1820), T h e Histoical Es say s, cit., p. 90.
o' Bancroft, History, cit., vol. ll, p. 452.
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immigrating race was or v/as made to appeú by the romantic
k".pJ* of ihe national genealogy. That immigration was in fact
an 
-invasion, 
a modem conquest in its own right that had
established inimical distinctions between conquerors and
conquered, "civílizers" and "civilizees" (as Melville was to put
it a i.- years later, denouncing, in a larger context' what he
starkly .uil"d the "philosophy tofl the winner"),0'thus turning
the new subdued races into privileged candidates for the
historian's cheapest forms of sentimentality - a sigh 1nd.a
tear. Sadly *.rtitg upon many a historical "picture" of "the
uneoual contest" between the dominant and subjugated races,
Bancroft called for that purest kind of "compassion that is
honorable to humanity." "The weak," states the heir of the
victors, ,,demand sympathy." "If a melancholy interest attaches
to the fall of a heio, who is overpowered by superior force,
shall we not drop ^ teat at the fate of nations, whose defeat
foreboded the exile, if it did not indeed shadow forth the
decline and ultimate extinction, of a t^ce?"4r The historicist
"compassion" of the national chronicler here sounds just as a
residr-,al form of fellow-feeling for "the weak" and the defeated
on a conquered soil expression of doom irrevocably
pronounced upon the vanishing races.
Lowly Hurnanity
This residual form of fellow-feeling, tinged with historical
sadness about "the ruins of empires and the graves of nations,"to
o, Melville, "The South Seas" (1858), Tbe Pìazzn Tales and Otber Prose
Pieces, cit., p. 420.
o' Bancroft , History, cit., vol. lII, P. D6.
* Bancroft, "The ilecessity, the Reality, and the Promise of the Progress of
the Human Race" (1854), Literary and Histoical Miscellanies, cit'' p' 510'
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thrived on that sentimental "reverence for Humanity" that, for
decades, the Romantic Revolution had allegedly taught all its
writers between history and literature. " [T]he same movement
which effected the elevation of what was called the lowest class
in the state," says Emerson in "The American Scholar,"
"assumed in literature a very marked and as benign an aspect."
"The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the
philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life," he
continues, "are the topics of the time."a5 "Our age," proclaims
Bancroft in his eulogy of "the people" and "common life,"
"has seen a revolution in works of imagination":
The poet has sought his theme in common life. Never is
the genius of Scott more pathetic, than when, as in The
Antiquary, he delineates the sorrows of a poor
fisherman, or as in The Heart of Mid Lothian, he takes
his heroine from a cottage. And even \Wordsworth, the
purest and mosr original poet of the day, in spite of the
inveterate characrer of his political predilections. has
thrown the light of genius on the waiks of commonesr
lífe; he finds a lesson in every grave of the village
churchyard; he discloses the boundless treasures óf
feeling in the peasant, the laborer and the artisan; the
strolling peddler becomes, through his genius, a teacher
of the sublimest morality; and the solitàry wagoner, the
lonely shepherd, even rhe feeble morher of anldiot bov,
furnishes lessons in the reuerence for Humaniiy(emphasis added).0'
This was the "reverence" for that "secret spirit of humanity"
that, as \ùTordsworth maintained, could never be slassd - 2
n' Ralph \Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar" (1837), Essqs and
Lectures, ed. Joel Porte (New York: The Library of America, L9$), p. 68.
o' Bancroft, "The Office of the People," cit., pp. 411,-12.
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"spirit" haunting the "ruined walls" of lifg and history,
emerging from l'the remains".of unfinished projects and
formàti* efforts, surviving even amid the "oblivious
tendencies [o]f nature" and its "silent overgrowings'"ot And it
is exactly this respect that Bancroft invokes in his democratic
and hisioricist project of Jacksonian America, rhetorically
committed to girr. dignity to all the members of the human
race, especially the humblest and the commonest ones, who
or.r" tot. reciaimed from obscurity and oblivion and brought
back to their literary and historical life, past and present'
through the redemptive impulse of romantic consciousness'
Melrrille's use and abuse of the sympathetic outlook in the
works of his middle period must be understood against the
background of this naiional and international context - at the
inters=ection of sentimentality and historicism. His focus on
little men and abandoned women was therefore functional. It
was part of an authorial design whose purpose was-to depart
frorrr the ,,ontological heroics"ou of Titanic Ahab and Pierre as
well as to move beyond the considerate attention or
philanthropic reverence that romantic consciousness bestowed,
i. Burr..oft's sentimental and historicist terms again, on "lowly
humanity." "It is hard for the pride of cultivated philosophy,"
h" ,tut"r, "to put its ear to the ground, and listen reverently to
the voice of lowly humanity."o' Over against such rhetoric, after
his ambivalent tenure at "Young America in Literature" (and
"in Politics," we may add),tn Melville re-wrote the annals of
I
lti| :
" \lordsworth, "The Ruined Cottage," cit', ll' 486-506; "Michael: A
Pastoral p6srn" (1800), Selected Poerns and Prefaces, ed' Jack Stillinger (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 1.480.
o' Melville, "To Nathaniel Hawthorne, 29 Jtne L851," Correspondence'
cit . ,p. 196.
ou Bancroft, "The Office of the People," cit.,p' 425'
'o Melvi-lle, Piene, cit., p.244; see the whole Book XVII of the novel, titled
"Young America in Literature."
I
I
I
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compassion by investing the miseries of his downtrodden with
the problematics of history. He addressed the misfortunes of
the "forlornest of mankind"t' whose lives had produced no
effects and left no traces; forsaken figures doomed to
impermanence or marked by unrelievable sorrows; forgotten
heroes whose deeds had remained unrecorded in the annals of
the nation, flickering for a moment on the historical stage and
then disappearing into a life of obscurity. By so doing, he re-
oriented the question of history itself against the course of its
own romantic historicist development, whether that
development had been dictated by pietas and cultural
relativism on one side, or urged by historical vengeance and
aversive political praxis on the other.
The author of Moby-Dick and Pierre thus turned to
hopeless figures and nameless characters to portray them as
problematic objects of knowledge or all-too-obvious examples
of suffering - lonely and isolated human beings who
command attention and elicit deep emotional responses. On
the one hand, as problematic objects of cognition, these
unfathomable characters ultimately resist and frustrate the
beholders' cognitive and/ot conative approaches grounded in
feeling. On the other, as all-too-obvious and all-too-human
sufferers demanding pity (whether willingly or not), they
deflate the equation of feelings and unmask the ambiguous
limits of the sentimental incapacity to act. Thus through the
failure or the ambivalences of emotional identification and
psychologic al patticipation, Melville questioned, to begin with,
the primary understanding of individual forms of life. Since
such a mode of understanding ("the understanding of other
persons and their expressions of life," to recall Diltheyt
phrase) lies at the heart of historical knowledge, then it is not
" Melville, "Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of \X/all Strea" (1853), The
Piaan Tales and Otber Prose Pieces, cit., p. 30.
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too much to say that the cognitive problems that Melville
dramatized through the condition of his wretched ones put at
stake nothing less than the epistemological foundations of
historical consciousness, and, consequently, the ethics of
historical action at the moment of praxis' In other instances he
rescued his downtrodden from the paradoxes of the cognitive
processes. But as he took care to define their social context in
some detail, he ruthlessly transformed them from potential
representatives of the human family at lúge (that "common
humanity" that the lawyer-narrator movingly though
unavailingly invokes in "Bartleby")" into the vanquished of
specific historical situations - the American poor, anonymous
factory v/orkers, the servants or the casualties of the new
market-place economy, the subdued peoples of the continent
(the enslaved races as well as the conquered and vanishing
ones) in front of whom the sentimental strategies of
benevolence and redemption become even more suspect. As
he moved on from the short stories to his longer tale "Benito
Cereno" and his two novels, Israel Potter and The Confidence-
Man,Melvlle, in fact, came also to question the larger patterns
of national and universal history based on evolution and
process, origins and telos. He shook the foundations of the
revolutionary fathers and the monuments that presided over
their rituals of continuity. He probed the moral structure of
the American ideals of "equality" and "unity of the race"
(in Bancroft's rhetoric again)" to unmask their ideological
assumptions and bring to light the divisive issues they
were supposed to neutralize. He clouded the prospects
toward which the unfulfilled prophr:cies of a country he
" Ibidern,p.28.
" Bancroft, "The Office of the People," cit., p. 4D; "The Progress of the
Human Race," cit., p. 508.
49
himself had once envisioned as "the advance-guard" of the
world were still oriented by dubious expectations that, after
all, "ls]omething further may follow" of the American
"Masquerade."t'
Abandoned îDomen
In the wake of the projected "story of Agatha," a î.ale
about a deserted woman that he sketched in his so-called
"Agatha Letters" to Nathaniel Hawhorne but that apparendy
never saw the light of day," Melville started his new career as
an anonymous contributor to the literary magazines of the
time. In "Bartleby the Scrivener," he may be said to have
created the first (un)sentimental character of his neq lowly
universe of defeated figures, avaling himself of themes, scenes,
and methods usually employed in sentimental representation.
"Poverty" and "solitude," "fuins" and "hopelessness,"
"unrelieved calamities" and "death" - a77 of them shaped the
strategies of feeling he exploited to dramatize the confrontation
between witness and victim (the lawyer-narîatoî and the
copyist) and set up, through the breakdown of the ethics of
sympathy, his critique of historical consciousness. The lawyer's
ultimate reduction of sympathy to pure emotion - 1s-sn2s1scl
through narration and writing (his "líttle history") - takes
place at the end of an extended and even redundant process of
understanding ("\What do you mean?" is one of the attorney's
" Melville, \Y/hite-Jacket; or The l{/orld in a Man-of-\X/ar (1850), eds.
Hay'ord, Parker, and Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern U. P. and
The Newberry Library, 1970), p. 151; The Confídence-Man: His Masquerude
(1857), eds. Hayford, Parker, and Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern
U. P. and The NewberryLibrary, 1984),p.251.
" Melville, Correspondence, cit., pp. 23 1 -42, 621-25.
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refrains) as well as of several ineffectual attempts at human
action ("rVhat had one best do?" is another). \X/hile the climax
of the story exposes, once and for all, the ideological stance of
the master, the process as a whole involves and calls into
question the master's affective responses as well as his
cognitive and conative ends. As we are allowed to follow the
lawyer's renewed efforts to come closer to his elusive clerk and
grasp his anomalous conduct - his professional concerns as
an employer, as well as his apparently tolerant strategies of
postponement and disinterested reconcilements - we can see,
at first, an eamest spectator go through several instrumental
endeavors. As he then feels the necessity to go beyond his
utilitarian approach ("He is useful to me") and understand
more intimately the problematic human being he confronts,
the lawyer relies on his emotional faculties sympathetically to
penetrate into the scrivener's inner life, first reaching some
form of communion or contact ("fraternal melancholy," "bond
of a common humanity," "sincerest pity"), then realizing his
limitations and finally recoiling ("it was his soul that suffered,
and his soul I could not reach"). He also unsuccessfully tries to
reconstruct a biographical and a chronological context of sorts
("his history," "his native place," his "home") to make sense of
him and help him, then ultimately retrieving sympathy, as pure
compassion for a lost brother of wasted humanity ("Ah,
Bartleby! Ah, humanity!"), to cope once more unsuccessfully
with the problem of his haunting servant.'n
In most of the magazine pieces that followed in its wake,
Melville capitalized on the same stratel;ies he employed in his
"Story of \X/all Street" so as to continue his critique of the
notion of sympathy, draining fellow-feeling of its sentimental,
epistemological and pro-social pov/er. Some of his most
striking stories are those that focus on figures of deserted or
" Melville, "Bartleby," cit.,pp. 13-45.
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exploited women. As worthy descendants of abandoned
Agatha (waiting for her vaníshed husband in a "lighthouse,"
between the land and the sea, remote "from any settled
place"), Melville's miserable wives and lonely girls are all
similarly and symbolically located in liminal spaces - a
"sequestered" and "lone island" in "an archipelago of
aridities" (Hunilla); a "wretched shanty" in "a very lonely part
of the country" (Mrs. Merrymusk) or a "two-acre patch" at the
margins of a rich squire's land (Martha); a ftozen "hamlet" "in
a very out-of-the-way corner" (the "blank-looking girls" in
Tartarus) or a "small abode [...] in a pass between two worlds,
participant of neither" (Marianna)." These mar ginil. locations
bespeak the women's correspondent conditions of physical
disability and spiritual alienation, psychological confusion and
existential indeterminacy.
The representation of these heroines is usually
complementary to the concomitant portrayal of disinterested
beholders and compassionate chroniclers, all male and first-
person narrators, often travellers on a local or a larger scale.
Their eyes meet situations of sorrow and poverty, their voices
recount tales of decline and death. But Melville no longer
involves these men - in spite of their genuine and generous
feelings - in problematic or complex cognitive processes.
Hunilla's "anxiety and pain," Martha's "gîief" and the white
maids' "unrelated misery" Mrs. Merrymusk's "dolefirl life" and
Marianna's "wakeful rÀr'eariness" are all common forms of
suffering that are not shrouded in mysteries.t'Unlike Bartleby's,
" Melville, Correspondence, cit., p. 2)6; "The Encantadas," "Cock-A-
Doodle-Doo! Or, The Crowing of the Noble Cock Beneventano" (1851), "Poor
Man's Pudding," "The Taftarus of Maids," "The Piazza," The Piaaa Tales and
Ot h er Prc s e Piece s, cit., pp. 15 1, 142, 28I, 289, 33 4, 8.
x Melville, "The Encantadas," cit.,p. 155; "Poor Man's Pudding," 
"it., 
p.
295: "T\e Tartarus of Maids," cit., p. )27; "Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!," cit., p.286
"The Piazza," cit., p. 12.
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the source of these characters' affliction is obvious. \X4rether of
itself overflowing or blank, shrunken in wasted bodies or
hardened by the frost of cosmic insensibility ("the frost which
falleth from the sky"), their psyche is accessible to the
understanding of the male spectators, or at least, however
vicariously, to their imaginative self-projection, even when, as
in the more problematic case of the Chola widow on Norfolk
Isle, the "lone, shipwrecked soul" of the Indian woman is
resistant to open itself up to scrutiny or subject itself to the
influence of external ínteractions ("She but showed us her
soul's lid, and the strange ciphers thereon engraved," muses
the sailor-naîratoî; "a11 within, with pride's timidity, was
withheld").'u Melville's beholders/narrators feel deeply for
these destitute sisters of lowly humanity and, whether in
"tears" or "filled" with "emotion," "wrapped in t...]
meditations" or "lost in thought,"uo they are all apparently in a
position to grasp the plight of their feminine counterparts.
Howeveq though it usually culminates in a moment of both
profound absorption and cognitive insight, their fellow-feeling
is either smothered and soon abandoned or just kept to a state
of pure, private resonance, as if its open, sentimental
expression or the pro-social action it was supposed to incite
were already thought of as inadequate, ineffectual, or false.
Starkly, some of Melville's wítnesses and chroniclers, after
feeling and understanding "the wretchedness of the
unfortunate,"ut aÍe deliberately reluctant to act. The extension
of sentiment and the subsequent (and often obvious) cognitive
fulfillment open no prospects for relief in practical reality.
The disconnection of the I from the Thou that the lawyer
in "Bartleby" had startlingly discovered along the tortuous
" Melville, "TheEncantadas," cit.,pp. 162, 157,155.
* Ibidem, p. 155; 'The Tartarus of Maids," tit , pp. 332, )i4,135; "Cock
A-Doodle-Doo ," cit., p. 285.
" Melville, "Poor Man's Pudding," cit.,p.296.
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course of_ his cognitive quest comes to be repeatedly
dramatized by Melville as a plain mamer of faci in hi;
subsequent tales of "ailing" wives and "pallid" virgins.u, The
parting of souls usually brings to a climax rh; movins
encounters which these tales dramatize. They all end with thé
narrators leaving the objects of their sympathy and
compassionate understanding alone.',!lhen a companion's
heart of itself overflows" - pgsss the narrator of ,,poór Man's
Pudding," a,s 
_"Rale and chill" Martha mourns the premature
loss of her children and discloses all her "dark grief,i to him in
ruthless contrast with her added "paleness of a mother to be"
- 
('1hs best one can do is to do nothing." So he abandons the
woman, conforming himself ro rhe typically passive role of the
witness in sentimental representation - both observer and
listener, whose intense emotional and mental involvement
"honor[s] humanity" but does nothing (can do nothing)
towards immediate assistance or future redress. ,,I could stiy
no longer to hear of sorrows for which the sincerest
sympathies could give no adequate relief," the man tells us; ,,I
bade the dame good-bye; shook her cold hand; looked mv last
into her blue, resigned eye, and went out into the wet."oi
As the narrator of "Poor Man's pudding" honors
humanity, so Hunilla's rescuers show such a ,,sileni reverence
of respect" for the widow as was never received bv ,,anv wife
of the most famous admiral." Similarly, the traveier in ,,The
Tartarus of Maids" is so deeply moved by the white enslaved
factory workers in the paper-mill that "some pained homage to
their pale virginity [makes him] involuntarily bo.r," wtrilé his
cheeks, as in a momentary identification with .,the consumptive
pallors of ltheir] blank, nggy Efe," turn ,,whitish,, too bàfore
' Melville, "Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!," cit., p.2g4;,,The Tartarus of Maids."
a i t . ,  p .334.
" Melville, "Poor Man's Pudding," cit.,pp.295,2g4,296.
54
he leaves the "sunken place" for good, And even when
compassion in the face of suffering turns into an openly
perverse, clamorous song of unlikely joy (a "glorious and
rejoicing crow," as for the Merrymusks in "Cock-A-Doodle-
Doo!"), Melville's beholder is inevitably called to witness
death, bury "the sick ones" and "the invalids," and plant "the
stone" on their (definitely unsentimental) grave near the (still
more unsentimental) "taifroad track," here a sorry symbol of
Antebellum American progress meant "to fly over, and not to
settle upon" that "paft of the world" that in "a divided
empire" naturally belongs to the destitute.s All trained in
feeling, as "with a brother's love," viewing and /ot re-viewing
those women's sufferings in barren places and miserable
dwellings, Melville's beholders - we may say along with
\ùTordsworth 
- all submit to their functional "impotence of
grief." And this "impotence," as such, namely as a lack of
power and therefore inaction caused by "the sincerest
sympathies" in the face of suffering, is what Melville
denounces in its ethical shortcomings (the suspension of the
capacity to act that allegedly heightens that cultivation of
moral sentiments that is honorable to humanity) as well as in
its largeg romantic and democratic claims to literary
redemption or historical resurrection and glorification of the
downtrodden. Thus Melville's creation of a spiritual aflnity
between female victims and male spectators becomes only a
contrived strategy - a touching and temporary experience
that works as a prelude to an abrupt suspension of emotional
correspondence and linguistic interaction. As such, it breaks
off from the circuit of identification and communion,
resemblance and analogy, dialogic exchange and communi-
' Melville, "Poor Man's Pudding," cit., p.294; "The Encantadas," cit., p.
159; "The Tartarus of Maids," cit., pp. )34, t0,315; "Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!,"
cit., pp. 286, 284, 285, 288, 282, 268.
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catíon, and comes out in passivity and separation, extenuating
reflections and self-justifications, silence and resigned
withdrawals. In these cases, the sentimental "extension of
feeling" eventuates not so much in a "restitution of
humanity"" as in its further abandonment and deprivation -
a denial of kinship and reciprocity between fellow-beings in
general and between genders (and classes and races) in
particular, on the larger backdrop of a dominant 'American'
vision of "social sensibilities," "political princi-ples," and
rans-continental "distinctionls]" harshly at odds with what
Melville calls " grind-stone experience. "6
If the dangers for these wretched ones may be those "of
being forgot by every body" (Smith), left with "no memorial"
(\X/ordsworth), or lost among "the ruins of formative efforts,
that were never crowned with success" (Bancroft), then the
moral philosopher, the sentimental writer, and the epic
historian may be said to have fashioned restitutive strategies of
"femembrance," "invocations," and "consolation" to keep
alive our memory of them and cherish their sufferings and
sacrifices either through the cultivation of emotion (whether
recollected in tranquillity or not) or through the "deve-
lopment" of "the moral powers" that always characterizes the
"upward course" of humanity.6t "Here, too, is our solace for the
indisputable fact, that humanity, in its upward course," states
Bancroft, "passes through the shadows of death, and over the
relics of àecay." "Nothing is lost," he continues. "Flumanity
moves on, attended by its glorious company of martyrs."ut For
Melville, instead, the real danger for the "unfortunate and the
6' I am here using Fisher's terminology ^ gatn, Hard Facts, cit., p. Il8.
" Melville, "Poor Man's Pudding," cit., p.296.
u' Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, cit., p. 13; rX/ordsworth, "The
Ruined Cottage," cit.,17.67-79;Banuoft "The Progress of the Human Race,"
cit . ,pp.51,0,511; "The Off ice of the People, '  ci t . ,pp.422,428.
t' Bancroft, "The Progress of the Human Race," cit., pp. 510, 511.
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injured" of mankind is exactly that of being exhumed from the
tombs of oblivion and non-existence iust to be anonymously
celebrated as lost brothers and sisters of common humanity for
the cultivation of sentiments, reincorporated within the
irresistible "progress of the î^ce," or assembled in a ghostly
procession of "martyrs" allegedly mobilized by the keepers of
historical progress to accompany the forward march of
humanity. And this danger is clear every time they come to be
included in narratives that, at bottom, are not their own -
little stories as well as larger tales such as the lawyer's "little
history" about the strangest scrivener he ever saw, the sailor's
"little story" of "vanquished" humanity on the Galapagos,
"many as real a story" promised by the narrator-voyager at the
end of "The Piazza," that is to say, at the beginning of Tbe
Piazza Tales, ctt even a "liftle narrative" like that of Israel
Potter, "rescued by the merest chance from the rag-pickers"
and presented as a pathetic "tribute" to the private of Bunker
Hill and the whole nation..e Therefore they need protection
and must be sheltered from the inadequacy or the complicity
of sympathy as well as from the misleading claims of cultural
relativism, cognitive impartiality, or narrative objectivity.
Melville's way to safeguard his humble characters is to leave
them a1l as they are through what may be called a strategy of
authorial abandonment. And this strategy is never more
manifest and, as it were, doubly critical than in these tales of
abandoned women subjected to further desertion - miserable
wives and hopeless girls, all, of them resigned and
unredeemably relegated to their ultimate destiny of pain,
loneliness, and oblivion.
u' Melville, "Bartleby," cit., p. 14; "The Encantadas," cit., pp. l5l, I57;
" The P iazza," ci t., p. 14 I s ra e I P o t t er, cit., pp. vii-viii.
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TbeL3nelyGi! . 
.
.-'lf,-"sad. Agath6" is. the first woman to emerge from
M5lvillg's mind as a possible 'rheroine" in her ovrn right, then
"the pale-cheeked girl" of "ThePiazza," Marianna, is the last
and most absffact and literary one to step into his short fiction
of the 1850s as a female protagonist. \X/hile "the forsaken
wife" may thus be viewed as the founder of Melville's lowlv
feminine world, the solitary "mountain-girl" may be said tó
crown the whole genealogy of downtodden women.7' As Scott
is never "more pathetic," according to Bancroft, ,.than when
[...] he takes his heroine from a cottage," or til/ordsworth never
more moving than when he has his "teacher of the sublimest
morality"T' teil us a "tale of silent suffering,, about Margaret
and her ruined coftage, so is Melville never more critical oi the
romantic tradition (on a literary as well as on a larger historical
level) than when he re-writes one more unsentim;ntal story of
autborial abandonment about this abandoned orphan giri in
her "grayish cottage" (p. 8) on Mount Greylock, in Berkshire,
Massachusetts. Like Hunilla, Martha, and all her unfortunate
companions of Melville's shorr works of the 1850s, Marianna
plays the role of the typical heroine in sentimenral narrarive.
And for her too, as for all her forlorn sisters, the separation of
souls (and therefore rhe impossibility of any iedemptive
spiritual communion) marks the turning point of the móving
encounter with her male visitor. For the Berkshire maid,
though, this parting tums out to be all the more ironic and
paradoxical as her meeting with the man is not determined by
"a narrow chance" (Hunilla), a more or less occasional sally
- 
7o Melville, Conespondence, cit., p.62t;*Thepiazza,,, cit., p.6. Further
references to the story in this final section of the essav, will be included
parenthetically in the text.
'' Bancroft , "The Office of the People," cit., pp. 4Ll-L2.
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into the country (Mrs. Merrymusk, Martha), or some
"business" or errand of sorts (the white gids in Tartarus),t' but
is deliberately envisioned and elaborately set up by the
narrator as a literary goal, the imaginative destination of what
may be viewed as a visual passion first and a creative action
later. The encounter between the man and Marianna on Mount
Greylock is in fact teleologically thought of as a terminal point
of a complex aesthetic experience that takes place through a
two-stage dramatic sequence following upon the foundational
act paî excellence - the building of the piazza.
Intertextuality (rich to the point of mannerism in this
piece) may help us shed light on the pre-condition of the
namator's aesthetic experience, namely the construction of the
porch to his old farmhouse. Here, in particular, intertextuality
leads us back to Emerson's poem "The Problem" (a poem,
originally titled "The Priest," about religious and literary
vocation), where the foundational act of building is presented
through "The hand that rounded Peter's dome," namely the
"hand" of Michelangelo. As "Himself from God he could not
free," Emerson states, conflating artistic creation and divine
inspiration, "He builded better than he knew." Bancroft re-
wrote Emerson's lines in his commemoration of the death of
Andrew Jackson to celebrate a fundamental political act such
as the constitution of Tennessee: "Themselves from God they
could not ftee; / They builded better than they knew."t'
"\lhoever built the house," echoes Melville's narrator at the
beginning of the story, "he builded better than he knew" (p.
1). Still the house has no piazza - a "deficiency," to his eyes,
" Melville, "The Encantadas," cit., p. 158; "The Tartarus of Maids," cit., p.
324.
" Emerson, "The Problem" (1840), Collected Poems and Translatìons, eds.
Harold Bloom and Paul Kane (New York: The Library of America, 1994),1).. 19-
24; Bancroft, "Commemoration of Andrew Jackson" (1845), Literary and
Historical Miscellanies, cit., pp. 449-50.
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that cannot be ignored. Not to have a porch, "fot a house, so
situated in such a country" the narrator remarks, is in fact "as
much of an omission as 1f a picture-gallery should have no
bench," or a cathedral no "pa*." Though on a smaller scale,
the foundational act must be reiterated and brought to
completion: "A piazza must be had." In fact, the building of
the piazza comes to be correspondently viewed as a task of
both artistic and religious fulfillment: "beauty is like piety," the
narrator tells us, "you cannot run and read it; tranquillity and
constancy, with, now-a-days, an easy chair, are needed." Thus
from the new porch of his old farmhouse - once irs
construction has been accomplished - the man can turn into
a pious devotee of "the country round about." His inítial,
detached experience of aesthetic fruition sees him in the static
and comfortable role ("tranquillity and consrancy, with 1...1 an
easy chair, are needed") of a refined and appreciative beholder
of Nature's beauty, The second experience, instead, is a more
demanding creative and cognitive quesr - what he calls his
"inland voyage to fahy-land," a "true voyage," he tells us,
"but, take it all in all, interesting as if invented." This active
and definitely less tranquil involvement in Nature's beauty sees
him in the subsequent dynamic role of a knight/voyager
searching for an knaginary "queen of fairies," the
contemplation of whom may be able to cure his "weariness"
and regenerate him (pp. 1,4,6).
The first aesthetic experience as a worshipper of Nature
begins to narrow down as the narrator focuses on "some
uncertain object" his eye seems to have caught from the piazza
"in a sort of purpled breast-pocket, high up in a hopper-like
hollow, or sunken angle, among the northwestern mountains."
As the object in question is "visible" only "under certain
witching conditions of light and shadow," it rakes the beholder
"ayeat or more" to tealize,in"awizatd afternoon in autumn,"
the presence of "such a spot" and determine its position. "One
spot of radiance," he tells us, "where all else was shade." And
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it is upon this spot that his creative imagination thrives:
"Fairies there, thought I; some haunted ring where fairies
dance" (pp.4,5).As in "the following Muy," after "a gentle
shower," the same spot happens to be marked by "the
rainbow's end," his imagination keeps fervently working in the
same direction: "Fairies there, thought I." This aesthetic vision,
though, is counterbalanced by what may be taken as the
viewpoint of common sense - the common sense of humble
people, apparently deflating his high and transfiguring
rhetoric. "But," the narrator adds, "a work-a-day neighbour
said, no doubt it was but some old barn - an abandoned
one." This divergence of opinion, however, reveals not so
much a clash between the mind's world (the narrator's) and
common life (the worker's), imagination and reality, as one
between two literary modes in their own right, the allegory of
fairy land on one side, and the sentimentality of ruins on the
other. Expectedly, as for the construction of his piazza, the
naffatoî thinks he knows better than his neighbours. And
though "la] few days later" he seems to come down from the
peaks of his visions, he setdes not so much on a prosaic "batn,
much less an abandoned one," as on a more poetic, almost
magical, cottage: "it must be a cottage; perhaps long vacant
and dismanded," he concedes, "but this very spring magically
fitted up and glazed" (p. 5). And one noon, as he reiterates his
poetic view upon "a broader gleam" from the mountains, he, at
bottom, still keeps phantasizing about fairy land and romance,
imagining, for his cottage, "a roof newly shingled" - 6ns th31'
to him, makes "pretty sure the occupancy of that far cot in fairy
land." Then again in September, during his convalescence after
an illness that had kept him to his chamber for some time, one
more gleam from the mountain is just like an irresistible call to
adventure summoning him forth to the world of action:
I saw the golden mountain-window, dazzling like a
deep-sea dolphin. Fairies there, thought I, once more;
6I
ttre queen of fairies at her fairy-window; at any rate, some
glad mountain-girl; it will do me good, it will cure this
weariness, to look on her. No more; I'll launch my yawl
- 
ho, cheerly, heart! and push away for fairyJand -
for rainbow's end, in fairyJand (pp.5, 6).
As he had earlier enrerrained the possibility that rhe "haunred
ring" might just be a "cottage" (though "in fairy land"), so
now, even as he is about to turn from a distant beholder into
an involved participant, he does not conceal from himself the
eventuality that "the queen of fairies" might "at any rate" turn
out to be only a "glad mountain-gid." However, what is
expected as a consequence, in either case, is a curative and
rcvitalizing effect upon his health.
Thus a "free voyager as an autumn leaf," one early dawn
the namator sallies westward, sailing through a "languid
region," to "the fairy mountain's base" and a "pasture." Then
he keeps journeying "on" through a "winter wood road,"
"beneath swaying fir-boughs," and then "on," and "on," and
"still on, and up, and out into a hanging orchard" ("Fairy land
not yet, thought I"), to "a ctaggy pass," through a"zigzagroad
[...J among the cliffs," through a "rent" where a "foot-track"
winds up "to a little,low-storied, grayish cottage":
The foot-track, so dainty narrow, just like a sheep-track,
led through long ferns-that lodgld. Fairy land'at lasi,
thought I; Una and her lamb dwell here. Truly, a small
abode - mere palanquin, set down on the summit, in a
pass between two wodds, participant of neither (pp. 6,
7 , g ) .
As the ffaveller reaches his destination, fairy land turns into a
marginal domestic setting, a decaying mountain house
surounded by wild and vagrant nature. "Nature, and but
nature, and house and all." Rituallv revelation occurs on the
limen:
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Pausing at the threshold, or rather where the threshold
once had been, I saw, through the open door-way, a
lonely girl, sewing at a lonely window A pale-cheeked
girl, and fly-specked window, with wasps about the
mended upper panes (p. 8).
As silence wraps the epiphanic encounter (she "silently
resumed her own [stool] [...J now, for a space, I, too, was
mute"). the narrator tries to come to terms with his delusion:
"This, then, is the fairy-mountain house," he broods, "and
here, the fairy queen sitting at her fairy window" (p. 9).
The disappointment of Melville's visitor is not one that
throws a bucket of cold rcality in the face of a fervent
imagination, but one that does substitute - as intimated
earlier, and as eadier however reluctantly and transcendentally
contemplated by the narrator himself one literary
expectation for another. Melville just replaces the enchanted
universe of romance and fairy land with the sentimental, small
wodd of one more abandoned woman in one more ruined
cottage. Both of them are expectedly (and romantically)
literary though the latter seems utterly unsuitable to the
naîratoî, who (as a former "tropic sea-going" voyager) could
even go as far as envisioning lone Marianna,for illusion's sake,
as "some Tahiti gid, secreted for a sacrifice."Ta In fact, as he
discovers that Marianna is no " glad mountain-gid" either, his
disappointment grows as vísibly as his compassion for the
hardships and sufferings of the young woman grows silently.
\X/ith tears in her eyes Marianna tells her touching story
summarized by the narrator's male voice - a story of loss and
loneliness ("Long had they been orphans," she and her
to For a different view of Melville's play between expectation and
disappointment, see Bruno Monfort's insightful essay "Melville's 'The Píazza':
Architecture into Vanishing Form," Letterature d'Anerica,9I (2002), pp. 107-11
and ff.
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younger brother, only seventeen, "and now, sole inhabitants of
the sole house upon the mountain"), as well as one of partings
and ruins (her brother "left his bench [...] for his bed [...] for
still deeper rest," while she is left completely alone in the "old
house"). The namatol again, is mute. "silent I stood by the
fairy window," he says, "while these things were being told"
(pp .  8 ,9 ) .
The sentimental setting is here at its most conventional, as
much as the emotional intensity between the characters is at its
most sentimental - an "old" and "rotting" cottage; the
overgrowings of nature all around it that typically resdfy to rhe
almost unsustainable enduring of human presences and traces;
a woman alone in a between-world surrounded by the death
shadows of the past and the "lifeless shadows" of the present,
in a "stillness" where "strange things" and "strange fancies"
conflate and become one another (pp. 10, 11). The girl, as
both victim and witness of painful separations and
abandonment, decline and ruin, is now the lone survivor of a
shrunken, residual life. Only "fractionally alive," as aJ,
survivors in sentimental. nanative,Tt Marianna is immobilized
in a stagnant world of deprivation and negation, while at the
same time paradoxically caught in the whirl of "dull woman's
work" and an ever-spinning mental anguish ("knowing
nothing, hearing nothing 1...1 never reading, seldom speaking,
yet ever wakeful t...1 sitting, sitting, restless sitting t...1
Thinking, thinking"). The narrator realizes rhat,
understandably, she would like to break away from such a
miserable life. Her desire is to travel to that "faroff, soft, azure
world" - the one she views and dreams about from her
mountain window (a "fairy window" indeed), the world the
narrator himself comes from - and look at the h"ppy person
7t This is Fisher's definition of the survivors, as
narrative, Hard Facts, cit., p. 120.
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who lives down there. So he realizes that she too, like himself,
is unhappy and foolishly hopefirl, she too, like himseli is
misleadingly looking for an enchanted counterpart in fairy
land, a "King Charming," a "happy being" who may do her
good and cure her "wakeful weariness" (pp. 9, 11, 12). So
there arises the rare possibility of a mutual and sympathetic
understanding between man and woman on the grounds of a
mirror-like existential and imaginative correspondence of
sentiments and desires as well as on a moment of frank,
dialogic exchange and transforming revelation through the
power of language. But the "two [gender] poles," so to speak,
just like the "fwo [hop-vinesJ poles" in Mariannat sentimental
"garden patch," are not destined to bring their shoots to a
"clasp" or a fulfillment of sorts:
Through the faity window, she pointed [...] to a small
garden patchnearby [...] where, sideby sid.e, some feet
apart, nípped and puny, two hop-vines climbed two
poles, and, gaining their tip-ends, would have then
joined over in an upward clasp, but the baffled shoots,
groping awhile in empty air, trailed back whence they
sprung (p.1.2).
This is what may be called a ruthless surrogate of sentimental
denial. As Marianna proves neither fairy queen nor glad
mountain girl, so the knight-voyager (supposedly "the happy
being" who lives in the far off world down there) proves no
healer, no King Charming. So he can neither relieve the girl
nor fulfill her most innocent wishes:
"Oh, if I could but once get to yonder house, and but
look upon whoever the happy being is that lives therel
A foolish thought: why do I think it? Is it that I live so
lonesome and know nothing?" (p.12).
The narrator is called to play the role of the witness in senti-
mental representation. He first feels compassion for her
"ruins," in sentimental
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fellow-mortal, and then freezes his moral sentiment into
inaction. So he breaks the spell of analogy and reflection, at
once concealing his negative epiphany behind rhe screen of a
pretended lack of cognition and legitimizing his silence
through a forced suspension of linguistic communication:
"I, too, know nothing; and, therefore, cannot answer;
but, for your sake, Marianna, well could wish that I
werethat hrppy one of the happy house you dream you
see; for then you would behold him now, and, as you
say, this weariness might leave you" (p. 12).
Here the man discontinues his linguistic interaction with
Marianna and, like all the other beholders of Melville's short
fiction, he too abandons the girl and does norhing (can do
nothing) for her. Maúanna is allowed no revelation of sorts, no
forward movement or progress, no romantic excursion or
escape. Left, once again, completely alone in her cottage (like
rùlordsworth's Margaret, "[]ast human tenant of [those]
ruined walls"),'u she is neither undeceived from her dreams
and "foolish thought[s]" (namely her literary innocence), nor
delivered from her solitude and destitution. She is nor even
given a narrative closure of her own. "Enough. Launching my
yawl no more for futy-land," states the naÍratot after his last
exchange with her, abruptly returning to the narrative present,
"I stick to the piazza" (p. t2).On the one hand, Melville
dramatizes such a nihilistic deadlock (at once a linguistic, a
cognitive, and a conative one - as the man says he knows
nothing, answers nothing, and does nothing) to unmask it as a
male strategy that is meant to deny the girl any possibility of
independent knowledge or liberating experie however
useful or useless may be the happiness she would iike to
pursue or the loss of illusions she would inevitablv suffer. On
the other hand, though, he also capitalizes on that patriarchal
strategy of containment to safeguard the lonely girl from an
altogether suspect (and no less paternalistic) redemption,
whether that may be aimed at ahappy ending of active gender
liberation or of passive domestic fulfillment (a self-reliant
journey, a conventional wedding) or aimed at a latger ethical
and historical retrieval of the maid, a secluded and forgotten
victim of the race of woman. in need of an enormous
restitution of life and respect, to be successfully reintegrated
and re-socialized into the larger family of common humanity.
Over against the similarity of human nature
charucteúzed by the same problem of existence, the same
bonds of life, the same exposures to the condition of mortality
- the sentimental denial that Melville imposes on his lowly
and lonely girl devitalizes the process of cognition and
conation based on self-understanding and (through an
allegedly shared lived experience) on the understanding of
other persons and their expressions of life. As such, it
questions the claims of romantic (literary and historical)
consciousness to attain fulfillment in the revelation of
personality and therefore in biographical and historical
knowledge and praxis at large. Thus Marianna, left on her
own, and therefore sheltered, enters and crowns Melville's
small community of wretched women and lonesome girls - all
of them heroines beyond the reach of any practical attempt at
material succor and spiritual alleviation, all of them outside the
compass of any larger historical retrieval and deliverance
through discursive glorification or counter-traditional versions
of hero-worship.
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"The Ruined Cottage," cit.,|.492.
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